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Abstract
Wireless technology are very widespread and used for a lot of applications. These wireless
networks are generally in ”infrastructure mode” and do not use the other possibility provided by
wireless technology. Wireless mesh network usages are really scarce.
This document focus on AODV-FUUREX implementation, a secure version of the routing al-
gorithms AODV. This implementation is compared with a basic version (AODV-UU).
Experiment scripts are written to work with OMF, a framework for managing experimental
platform. Different malicious behaviours are simulated to test AODV-FUUREX.
These tests are executed on two different environments. The first one is a virtual testbed which
was used to develop the experiment scripts and check that all the elements work good.
The second one is a real environment which is used with bigger topologies.
Furthermore, the implementation is improved.
keywords : AODV, Wireless Mesh Network (WMN), OMF
Re´sume´
Les technologies sans-fils sont tre`s re´pandues et utilise´es pour un grand nombre d’applications.
Ces re´seaux sans-fils sont ge´ne´ralement exploite´s en ”mode infrastructure” mais n’exploitent pas
les autres possibilite´s offertes par les technologies sans-fils. L’utilisation des re´seaux sans-fils en
re´seau maille´ reste marginale.
Ce document se concentre sur l’imple´mentation d’AODV-FUUREX, une version se´curise´e de
l’algorithme de routage AODV. Cette imple´mentation est compare´e a` une version de base (AODV-
UU).
Les scripts d’expe´rimentations sont e´crits pour fonctionner sur OMF, une plateforme de gestion
d’environnement de test. Diffe´rents comportements malicieux sont simule´s afin de tester le bon
fonctionnement d’AODV-FUUREX.
Ces tests sont effectue´s sur deux environnements diffe´rents. Le premier est un environnement
virtuel qui a permis de de´velopper les scripts d’expe´rimentations et de tester le bon fonctionnement
des diffe´rents e´le´ments.
Le deuxie`me est un environnement re´el qui est utilise´ avec de plus grandes topologies.
En plus de cette analyse, certaines ame´liorations sont apporte´es a` l’imple´mentation.
Mots-cle´s : AODV, re´seau maille´ sans-fils, OMF
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Internet is a wonderful tool which helps people to communicate and collaborate without a problem
of distance.
Internet was now became mandatory to communicate with people, to exchange or get information,
to manage bank account, to play, ... Internet usages are endless.
Internet is more and more present in our lives. At home, it is no more limited to a computer
on a desk. Internet must be available in each room. To permit it easily wireless networks are
commonly used. Internet provider offer often wireless access points with their Internet access.
More and more devices become able to communicate through wireless technology. It was com-
puter first, it’s phone and tablet now and it will be a lot of other devices in the future. Wireless
Technology is everywhere.
Actual wireless networks are centralized and have a limited range. To use Internet in the street
the only solution is to use a mobile data network which is not free of charge.
With the deployment of wireless technology, it becomes imaginable to create a wireless device net-
work. This network where all the devices are interconnected creates a huge web covering cities or
countries.
A big uncentralized network could bring new perspectives.
This type of technology could be a good solution by avoiding censorship and permitting data ex-
change in less developed countries. Another big advantage of this type of network is to be able to
roam using the network.
A lot of research has been made on this type of technology. Some projects are well developed
and propose a working implementation. But this technology is not generally available and is not
used everyday.
Basics implementations of this technology are often unsecure.
One example of this technology is called AODV[3]; this thesis will focus on a secure implemen-
tation of this network technology.
The secure version is tested and compared with a basic version. Test are made in two different
testbeds. The first testbed is a virtual environment which has the biggest advantage to be all the
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time available. The problem is that the results obtains in this type of environment hide parameters
like radio interferences, distance between nodes,...
A testbed with real nodes is used to check others parameters.
To test the security and compare the behaviour of the two implementations, malicious behaviour
are launched during the experiments.
The goals of theses tests are to check the robustness, the scalability, the ability to detect mali-
cious behaviour and to analyze the strengths and weakness.
The results of these experiments are discussed and analysed to propose improvements and





A wireless network is a computer network without cables. The nodes (devices with wireless con-
nection) are connected using radio waves. There are different types of standard wireless connection
like IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.15.4 which are the most common.
Figure 2.1: Wireless transmission
For a normal node without directive antenna, the waves are sent all around the node (Omnidi-
rectional radiation pattern) like on Figure 2.1.
Wireless nodes can be connected in two different modes:
• Infrastructure mode: In this case all the devices are managed by one device which is called
the access point. All the connections between nodes are relayed by this central node. To be
in the network, all the nodes must be in range of the access point. If the access point is down
all the network is unreachable.
This mode is commonly used by home user as access point for Internet.
6
CHAPTER 2. STATE OF ART
(a) Within radio range in dotted line. (b) Simplified model
Figure 2.2: Wireless network representation
Figure 2.2a shows an infrastructure wireless network with a master node represented by the
”M”. Only the nodes in the range of the master node are in the network.
A simplified model is represented on the Figure 2.2b.
• Ad-hoc mode: This mode allows connection between nodes without access point. All de-
vices on the same network are directly connected at the reachable neighbours.
(a) Within radio range in dotted line. (b) Simplified model
Figure 2.3: Wireless network representation
On Figure 2.3a, the wireless ad-hoc network is represented with dotted lines circles which
are the range of the nodes. To make it easier the radio waves circles are replaced by lines
between nodes which show the communication between nodes like on Figure 2.3b. If there is
no line between nodes, the nodes are not connected.
All the network in this document will be represented with the simplified model which is
clearer than the other.
2.2 Wireless Mesh Network (WMN)
A WMN is a special type of ad-hoc connection where all the nodes are interconnected in a mesh
topology. There is no central node. The coverage of the network depends of the connected devices.
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Each connected node increases the coverage.
To join another device on the network, the signal can be transmitted through intermediate nodes
to reach the receiver. Each node is a router in the mesh.
Some applications of wireless network are presented in [8] and [11]. There are diverse applications
like broadband Internet access, WLAN coverage and mobility, Mobile data network support, ...
All these applications are still in development or in pilot projects. WMN are really cost-effective.
The nodes build the network themselves. There is no cable needed.
The redundancy of the links is a big advantage. When a link is broken, another route can be used
to transfer data. To make it possible special routing protocols are needed.
2.3 Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET)
A MANET is a WMN for mobile device network. In this type of network all the nodes are free to
move. The links and the topology of the network are changing all the time. Despite these changes,
the network must maintain the information required to route the data.
2.4 Routing Protocols
To manage and route the data through ad-hoc wireless networks special routing protocols have
been implemented. There are three main types of protocols.
Figure 2.4: Routing protocols
2.4.1 Pro-active routing protocols
The pro-active routing protocols need to know all the nodes and all the paths of the network before
sending data. A table of routes is maintained on each node with the possible route to reach each
other. This type of protocol needs a lot of data transfer to keep all the routes up-to-date. Another
drawback is the time needed to recovery from a failure.
2.4.2 Reactive routing protocols
Reactive routing is also called on-demand routing protocol. These protocols are looking for a route
when it is needed. A route request message is broadcasted by the sender to find the best route to
the receiver. This request takes time, there is latency to find route. All these broadcast messages
could clog the network.
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2.4.3 Hybrid routing protocols
This type of routing protocol takes advantage of the pro-active and reactive routing protocol. In
this protocol, some nodes are connected with a pro-active routing protocol. These nodes constitute
a skeleton of the network. From these main nodes, the routes to the destinations are created by a
reactive protocol.
2.5 Secure ad-hoc routing protocols
Wireless network security threats are more important than wired networks. The biggest problem
is due to the air communications. In ad-hoc network another big threat is that the nodes must
rely on others.
These weakness make ad-hoc network really sensitive to attack and malicious behaviour.
2.5.1 Malicious Node
A complete list of attack is presented in [9]. Only the most common are presented here.
• Black hole attack: this attack is also called packet drop attack. The black hole node drops
the packets which must be relayed to other nodes.
• Grey hole attack: this type of attack is like the Black hole but with a selection of the dropped
packets. For example, the node drops only the HTTP packets.
• Wormhole attack: Wormhole attack are composed of 2 nodes. One node records the received
traffic and sends it by another network to another node located elsewhere in the topology
which replays the traffic recorded. In this attack, the data can also be manipulated by the
malicious nodes.
• Flooding: By this attack a node could make a denial of service on the network. If more than
one node are controlled to flood, this attack is more powerful.
2.5.2 Security solutions
The security of ad-hoc network is a research subject which is cover by articles like [10], [2] and [12].
The current proposals for solutions exploit two different ways:
• Cryptographic key usage: the usage of keys can authenticate the node and avoid problems
with malicious nodes. But the biggest problem with this method is the deployment of the
keys. The key must be shared before deployment or by a trusted intermediate. Both solutions
are a problem for incremental network composition.
Another problem is that cryptographic keys needs computation power and energy that must
be saved as much as possible for mobile devices.
• Reputation base: In this case, for each packet the node checks if the packet is forwarded by
the next-hop using the ability to listen the traffic of its neighbour. The node has a table
with the reputation of their neighbour. According to this reputation, the most trusted path
is selected to transfer data.
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2.6 AODV routing protocol
AODV is a reactive routing protocol for wireless ad-hoc network. This routing protocol is defined
by the IETF in the RFC 3561 [3].
This protocol is defined to be adaptive to the changes of topology. One of the aims of this protocol
is to be suitable for MANETS.
As reactive routing protocol, AODV is creating routes when they are needed for data transfer.
The route information are not stored in the packet. Each node has received the information to
choose the best next-hop to reach the destination. There are four message types in AODV which
are transmitted over UDP.
2.6.1 Route Request (RREQ)
Message sent by the source to discover a path to the destination when there is none known yet.
Figure 2.5: RREQ packet representation
• Type is set at the value 1.
• Join Flag: is used to join a multicast group.
• Repair Flag: is used to repair multicast route.
• Gratuitous Flag: if a intermediate node creates a RREP to the originator a RREP must be
sent to the destination.
• Destination only Flag: the RREQ must be forwarded by the intermediate nodes to the
destination. Only the destination can generate a RREP for this RREQ
• Unknown sequence number flag: indicates that the sequence number is unknown. Used
whenever a route has been created to join the destination.
• Reserved: is ignored
• Hop Count: number of node the RREQ went through.
• RREQ ID: unique value used to identify the RREQ.
• Destination IP Address: Address of the receiver.
• Destination Sequence Number: value used to identify the route to the destination and to
check the freshness of the route. Higher value = fresher route.
• Originator IP Address: Address of the sender.
• Originator Sequence Number: value used to identify the route to the originator and to the
check the freshness of the route. Higher value = fresher route.
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2.6.2 Route Reply (RREP)
Message in reply of the RREQ from the destination to the source. This message provides each
intermediate node information about the best path to reach destination.
This type of message is also used as Hello message. Hello messages are used by nodes to signal
their presence at their neighbours. To reach only the neighbours the TTL is set to 1 for the Hello
message.
Figure 2.6: RREP packet representation
• Type is set at the value 2.
• Repair Flag: is used to repair multicast route.
• Acknowledgement required Flag: is used to ask an acknowledgement if there is suspicion of
unidirectional link.
• Reserved: is ignored
• Prefix Size: used for supplied route in a specific subnet.
• Hop Count: copy of the RREQ hop count.
• Destination IP Address: the IP address of the destination specified in the RREQ.
• Destination Sequence Number: value used to identify the route to the destination and to
check the freshness of the route. Higher value = fresher route.
• Originator IP Address: address of the originator of the RREQ is also the destination of the
RREP.
• Originator Sequence Number: value used to identify the route to the originator and to the
check the freshness of the route. Higher value = fresher route.
2.6.3 Route Reply Acknowledgement (RREP-ACK)
Message sent as Acknowledgement of RREP. This type of message is used when there is a risk of
unidirectional links.
Figure 2.7: RREP-ACK packet representation
• Type is set at the value 4.
• Reserved field is ignored.
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2.6.4 Route Error (RERR)
Message used to advertise a problem on the route.
Figure 2.8: RERR packet representation
• Type is set at the value 3.
• No delete flag: is used to signal that the route is repaired and that there is no need to delete
it.
• Reserved field: is ignored
• Destination count: is the number of unreachable destination(s) due to a link break. This
value will add lines to the packet (minimum value is 1).
• Unreachable Destination IP Address: is the IP of the unreachable node.
• Unreachable Destination Sequence Number: is the ID of the broken routes.
• The others fields are created to add more unreachable destinations. For each pair of field,
the destination count must be incremented.
2.6.5 Routing table
Each node maintains a routing table with all the information needed to route data. In this routing
table we can find:
• Destination IP Address
• Destination Sequence Number which is used to identify the most recent route.
• Valid Destination Sequence Number flag
• Routing flags (valid, invalid, repairable, being repaired)
• Network Interface
• Hop Count (number of hops needed to reach destination)
• Next Hop to reach the destination
• Lifetime of the route until expiration.
2.7 AODV in use
The best way to understand how AODV works is by an example.
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2.7.1 Creation of the network
When a node arrives on the network, it broadcasts Hello messages to signal its presence. The
neighbours which receive the message add the node in their routing table.
Figure 2.9: Hello message broadcast
Hello message or other AODV control messages must be sent regularly to keep links alive with
the neighbours. Without Hello message or other AODV control message from a node the neighbour
drops the route and the node is no longer directly available.
2.7.2 Route creation
In this example, Node 1 is the sender and Node 5 is the receiver. It is the first data transfer in the
network and there is no route created before.
(a) Sender send RREQ (b) RREQ propagation
Figure 2.10: RREQ process
1. The sender wants to send data to the receiver and there is no route for the destination in the
routing table. The node broadcasts RREQ to its neighbours.
The RREQ is created with the needed data.
In the Destination Sequence Number field, the identifier of the last route to the destination
in the routing table. When it is the first RREQ to this destination a flag is activated.
The originator sequence number is incremented and added to the RREQ like the RREQ ID
which is also incremented by one. Each node manages is own RREQ ID counter.
The RREQ ID and the originator IP are saved by the node to avoid the reprocessing of the
RREQ received from its neighbours.
The Hop Count is set to 0. The RREQ is sent to all the neighbours like on Figure 2.10a.
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2. The RREQ is processed by Node 2 and Node 3. With this RREQ the route to the previous
hop is updated. The originator IP and the RREQ ID are checked and the packet is dropped
if this packet was received before.
Other RREQ are treated by the node. The hop count is increased by one and the reverse
route is created or updated to be ready to send RREP if needed.
If there is no route to the destination in the routing table, RREQs are broadcasted to the
neighbours like we can see on Figure 2.10b.
(a) RREQ propagation and RREP for route 1 (b) RREP for route 1 and 2
Figure 2.11: RREQ and RREP process
3. The sender drops the RREQ received from Node 2 and Node 3 which are identified by the
originator IP and the RREQ ID. In the same time node 4 process the RREQ like Node 2
and Node 3 at the previous step. The RREQ received by the receiver from Node 2 is pro-
cessed and a RREP is generated. The sequence number is incremented if the packet sequence
number is the same that the node’s one and added at the RREP. The originator IP and the
originator sequence number are taken in the RREQ and inserted in the RREP. The RREP is
unicasted to the next hop following the information added in the routing table. (Figure 2.11a).
4. At this step the 2 RREQs have reached the receiver. The RREQ from Node 4 is processed
like the request from Node 2.
The RREQ from Node 4 is discarded by Node 3.
Node 2 received the RREP from the receiver and changed the sequence number with the
sequence number recorded at the processing of the RREQ on Figure 2.10a. The routing
table entry is updated with the information of the RREP and update the next hop for the
destination from the originator (Figure 2.11b).
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(a) RREP for route 2 (b) RREP for route 2
Figure 2.12: RREP process
5. The sender has a path to send data to the destination. The route from the RREP is updated
in the routing table and the data can be sent to the receiver through the established path.
In the same time, the RREP on the second path is processed, like in the previous step for
Node 2, by Node 4 and forwarded to Node 3 like on Figure 2.12a.
6. The second RREP which arrived at the sender is dropped. AODV keeps only the shortest
path. The others are dropped.
2.7.3 Unidirectional link
If there is a unidirectional link on the shortest path to the destination, the originator will never
receive the RREP. To avoid this problem, when a originator haven’t response from the destination
a new RREQ is sent after a timeout.
When a node detects that the RREP transmission have failed, this node is blacklisted during a
fixed time. All the RREQs from this node will be dropped to let the chance to the same RREQ
from another path to be processed. To be sure that the route is created the destination or a node
forwarding the RREP can ask an acknowledgement at the sender by adding a flag ’A’ in the packet.
2.7.4 Broken link
When there is a route problem, the route must be invalidated and the affected nodes warned by
RERR message. RERR are sent by node if:
• the link to a next hop node of an active route (valid route in the routing table) is broken
• it received data for a destination which is not in its routing table.
• it received a RERR from a neighbour.
In this case, the node checks all the destination in its routing table and sends RERR to warn the
other nodes. The RERR is generally broadcasted with a TTL set to 1 to warn only neighbours.
RERR information are transmitted further if needed.
2.8 AODV-UU
AODV-UU is an implementation of the AODV (RFC3561) which run on GNU/Linux. The UU
stand for Uppsala University a Swedish university.
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This implementation works on all the 2.4 and 2.6 Linux kernels. A patch has been written to make
it work with the kernel 2.6.39 which is used on the virtual testbed.
2.9 AODV-FUUREX
AODV-FUUREX is based on AODV-UU. This implementation add a mechanism of reputation.
2.9.1 Reputation mechanism
The reputation mechanism is based on the Ph.D. thesis of Francesco Oliviero [7] who proposed a
reputation model called REFACING (RElationship-FAmiliarity-Confidence-INteGrity).
This reputation mechanism is based on three different reputation values.
1. The local reputation is managed by the node himself. Each node keeps the reputation of all
its neighbours. To compute the value, the node checks that the packets are duly transmitted
by its neighbours.
2. The global reputation is the reputation computed from the observation of the others nodes
in the network.
3. The current reputation is the merge of the global and the local reputation which represents
how much the node is trusted. This merging of reputation prevents reputation manipulation
from the malicious node.
2.9.2 Local reputation computation
On each node a module called watchdog is launched. This module is responsible to check that the
packet sent to the next-hop node are forwarded.
The Watchdog module is using the fact that wireless neighbour nodes are in radio range and that
the data are emited all around the node.
Figure 2.13: Node range
When Node 1 has sent a data to Node 2, watchdog keep the informations about the packet
in a table for a fixed time. In the same time, Node 1 is sniffing all the packets which are in its
radio range. When node 2 forwards the packet to Node 3, Node 1 received the same packet and
can increase the local reputation of Node 2. If after a time, the packet is not forwarded Node 1
decreases the local reputation of Node 2.
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(a) Node 1 sends data to Node 2 (b) Node 2 forward to Node 3 and Node 1 checks
Figure 2.14: Reputation security: Watchdog
2.9.3 Reputation table
To store the information of reputation on each node a list elements is created. In each element,
the reputation information of a neighbour are stored with:
• The IP of the neighbour
• The last twenty computed values for the local reputation
• The last twenty computed values for the global reputation
• The number of packet forwarded to this neighbour
• The current reputation
• The average reputation
• The reputation variance
• The amount of reputation update
The last twenty values are used to compute a weighted moving average like explain in [7]
2.9.4 Global reputation dissemination
The dissemination of the global reputation is important and must be performed safely. Due to
the broadcast nature of wireless network, the data could be used by the malicious node to take
advantage from having the neighbours’ opinion. To reduce the problem, the reputation propagated
by the node is a merging of the local reputation and the reputation of the others. In this way,
malicious node cannot detect which node started to propagate a bad reputation.
The global reputation of each neighbour is propagated by the RREQ messages in a special packet
field added.
When a node receives a RREQ, it checks if there are neighbour reputations in the packet and
update the global reputation with its local value.
The reputations of the neighbours of the node are added to the RREQ which is broadcasted to the
neighbours.
17
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2.9.5 Reputation in the route selection
In AODV, the route selected is the shortest path in hop-count. The length of the path is counted
during the RREP process. In AODV-FUUREX, the route selection must be different and uses the
reputation to select the most reliable route and not especially the shortest one.
The Hop-count in AODV-FUUREX is composed of the distance and correction factor which will
increase the length of the path if the node’s reputation is bad.
Another modification needed by AODV-FUUREX is to keep the different path values to compare
all of them. In AODV, the first response is the shortest and the best route. In AODV-FUUREX,
the shortest path could not be the best choice.
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In this chapter, the framework, the environments and all the configurations and scripts used to
test AODV are presented.
3.1 Experimentation Framework
OMF (cOntrol and Management Framework) is a framework used to manage experimental testbed.
OMF was developed at the beginning to work on ORBIT (a wireless testbed) and is now become
more universal and work with a lot of technologies.
OMF is a set of tools which help in all the steps of experimentation. OMF is used to prepare the
devices and deploy the data needed on each device.
During the experiment, OMF controls the devices and can take needed actions. Measurements are
also made by OMF and can be post-processed when the experiment is finished.
The software is separated in multiple parts like on Figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1: OMF components
• The Node Handler is installed on one machine to manage the experiments. It is this part
which communicate with the nodes and sends the commands to the nodes. It’s also the node
handler which deploys the image disk and binaries needed to run experiments.
• The Node Agent is installed on each node. It listens and executes the command received
from the Node Handler.
To make it easier a wrapper has been written by Giovanni di Stasi. With this layer, it is easier to
make a topology and to manage the experiment running process.
3.2 Experimentation script
Like we have seen in the previous part, all the experiments use OMF to control the differents
nodes. To make things easier, the experimental framework is helpful to reduce the complexity of
the definition of the experiments. The experimentals scripts are written in Ruby like OMF. When
we launch the experiment, we can specify differents parameters like:
• The topology
• The duration
• The data transfer speed and protocol type
• The routing protocol (AODV-UU or AODV-FUUREX)
• The activation/deactivation of the malicious nodes, the number and their activity scheme.
• The environment
All these elements must be specified before launching the experiment.
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3.2.1 The topology
The topology is written in a file and gives all the information at the experimental script to configure
each node according to its role. The roles are:
• Sender: Node which is used to send data in the network.
• Receiver: Node which receive all the data.
• Intermediate: All the nodes which are activated on the topology
The role of sender and of receiver must be specified at minimum one node. The experimental script
allows more than one sender and receiver. The topology file contains also the informations about
the bitrate of the wireless link. To complete the topology and create the different links between
the nodes another file is used. This file contains the list of the links between 2 nodes. Only the
nodes linked in this file can communicate together.
A link must exist between the sender and the receiver.
The nodes which are unreachable are considered as out of range node.
3.2.2 The duration
By default the duration of an experiment is fixed at 300 seconds. The duration of the experiment
must be longer than 100 seconds which is the route refresh rate of AODV. After this duration all
the routes are dropped and the RREQ procedure is restarted. To be sure that the network is well
stabilized after the activation of the malicious node and the first route refreshed a delay of 100
seconds is added.
There are 2 phases in the experiment script.
• The first 1/5 the experiment is running without malicious nodes
• The last 4/5 of the experiment the malicious nodes are activated.
The separation in two parts enables to study the behaviour of the routing protocol without malicious
nodes and let some time to check that everything goes well. It also enables AODV to create and
choose the best route. In some case, without the first phase, the malicious nodes would be dropped
directly and not considered during the route creation.
3.2.3 Data transfer speed and protocol type
To generate traffic, the experiment uses a traffic generator which is also configurable. The data
transfer speed and the protocol type can be changed with two parameters of the experimental
script.
It is important to be able to change the data transfer and to see the impact of the throughput on
the network and on the CPU usage of each node.
The protocol type can also have an impact on the performance. A connection-oriented protocol
like TCP will generate more traffic than a connectionless protocol like UDP which does not need
acknowledgement.
22
CHAPTER 3. TESTING METHODOLOGY
3.2.4 The routing protocol
All the experiments are executed with the two implementations of AODV (AODV-UU and AODV-
FUUREX). It is the best way to compare the two protocols and notice the differences.
To ease the switch, there is a parameter.
3.2.5 Malicious node management
The number of malicious nodes allowed for an experiment is N-2 (N=number of nodes in the
topology). The sender and the receiver cannot be malicious. There are two differents types of
nodes implemented to the experiment.
• Grey hole node: This type of malicious node filters the data and keep only the AODV traffic.
All the other packets are dropped.
To simulate this behaviour, the node uses iptable rules and allows only the AODV traffic to
go through. This behaviour has the advantage that the node remains on a potential route
because it answers all the RREQ and other AODV requests.
This type of malicious node cannot be detected by AODV-UU which is not checking if the
data traffic is transmitted.
• Black hole node: This malicious node drops packets of all types (AODV or data).
This behaviour is obtained by netem kernel module which provides functionality to emulate
delay, loss, duplication and re-ordering packet on a network. Two percentage values are
provided to the modules.
– The first value is the probability to drop a packet.
– The second value increases the probability that the next packet is dropped too.
With this configuration, black-hole can drop bursts and not only a single random packet. This
type of malicious node can be detected by AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX. If the number
of dropped packet is too high, the node seems disconnected and the path is removed. Because
packets are dropped randomly and the seed cannot be set, the results of the experiments are
not reproducible and the comparison between two experiments is difficult.
3.2.6 Environment
• Virtual Testbed: The virtual testbed is composed of 5 virtual nodes which are linked by a
virtual Ethernet bridge. This testbed is used to test the experiment script and check that
everything goes well with AODV. The deployment of experiment on this environment is re-
ally faster than on Orbit and the usage is not limited in time. The biggest problem on this
environment is the virtual link between the nodes. This link are more reliable than a wireless
one’s. There is no packet loss on this type of link.
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Figure 3.2: 5 nodes experiment topology
• Orbit: On orbit there are 400 nodes available. The reservation time is limited by slot of 2
hours. The experiment launched on Orbit are tested on the virtual testbed first.
We have used the Virtual Testbed topology on Orbit to be able to compare the results.
Another topology of 13 nodes has been also used to make some experiments. This topology
uses more than one sender. A lot of issues were detected with this topology and will be
discussed in section 4.3.
On Orbit some nodes have other wireless chipset which are working differently. All the nodes
must be checked before launching an experiment, to go quicker on Orbit and do not waste
time, this topology was selected because it was tested for others experiments.
The results with this topology were really useful to highlight problems but analyse was
impossible.
Figure 3.3: Orbit experiment topology
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3.3 Binaries
To run the experiment, all the nodes must be configured with AODV. To make it, some files are
uploaded on each node. All the binaries are on the main server and sent to the nodes at the
initialization of the experiment. Some files are sent to the nodes regarding the parameters and
roles in the experiment.
3.3.1 AODV-UU or AODV-FUUREX
The AODV implementation is the most important part of the experiment. This file is sent to all
the nodes and contains the AODV program and the kernel module. There are different versions
regarding the kernel version suited for the different kernel versions used on the virtual testbed and
on Orbit.
3.3.2 Traffic Generator
Traffic is needed to check if everything is working on the network. D-ITG 1 is the traffic generator
used for the experiment. This application is divided in different parts.
• A part of this application is installed on the sender(s) and generates the traffic on the network.
• Another part is installed on the receiver(s) and logs the traffic received in a file.
• A last part of this application is used to generate results from the log obtained during the
experiment.
3.3.3 Logger
In addition to data obtained by the traffic generator which are only about network, a ruby script
is installed on all the nodes to collect the CPU usage of AODV and the number of packets. This
script logs all this data in a file. The data are by default sampled every 3 seconds. This value can
be changed by a parameters when the script is launched.
3.4 Script in use
The experimental script is launched from a central server on which all the nodes are connected.
All the binaries needed by the experimental script are on the server. When the script is launched,
all the nodes are configured and the application is uploaded and launched.
When the script is launched there are different steps to install the nodes. The nodes are not
connected together during the installation.
• Node loading: the binaries are uploaded on the nodes to be configured by the experiment
script.
• Adding links between nodes: the topology is applied on the nodes and the links are configured.
• Configuring traffic generator: the traffic generator applications are installed on the sender
and the receiver and the destination address is given to the sender(s).
1
Distributed Internet Traffic Generator: http://www.grid.unina.it/software/ITG/
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• Configuring AODV routing protocol: the kernel modules for AODV is installed and the
AODV application is launched on all the nodes.
• Activation of the nodes and checking nodes: the network interface are activated and the
script checks if all the applications are working. When this step is finished all the nodes are
connected and the experiment is launched.
• A wait of 45 seconds is left to let AODV send HELLO message and to discover the neigh-
bourhood.
• The logger and the traffic generator are launched.
• The first step of the experiment start (1/5 of the experiment time).
• The second step is launched (4/5 of the experiment time).
• The experiment is stopped. All the applications are stopped and the interfaces are closed
down.
3.5 Post Processing
When the experiment is finished a script is launched to collect all the logs and interesting infor-
mations on the nodes.
With the collected data, an application provided with the traffic generator handle the data gener-
ated by the application.
The reputation log are handled by a Python script which computes time and generates a file for
each neighbour of the node.
Gnuplot is used to plot automatically the graphs according to the data extracted before.
3.6 Validation
To validate the results, the experiments have been made more than 5 times on the virtual testbed.
Due to the limited time on Orbit the experiments have been made 3 times maximum.
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In this chapter, the results of the experiments are presented and discussed. Each presentation
will be separated in two parts: a summary table and the discussion of the results including the
reputation of the sender’s neighbours computed by AODV-FUUREX.
4.1 Virtual Testbed Results
All the experiments presented in this section have been performed on the virtual testbed, with the
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4.1.1 Experiment #0 : without malicious node
The summary table is on page 29
• The throughput is the same for the two protocols. Without malicious node, the data
transfer is never interrupted and the bitrate stays at 5 kilobits par seconds.
• The delay of AODV-FUUREX is little bigger than the delay of AODV-UU. This difference
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.1: Experiment #O: Reputation node 2
Node 192.168.0.2 is on the shortest path. All data packets transit by this node to join the
receiver. This graph shows a reputation computation problem. According to the throughput
there is no packet loss but the reputation is decreasing nevertheless.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.2: Experiment #O: Reputation node 3
Node 192.18.0.3 is never used by 192.168.0.1 to send data because it is not on the shortest
path. There is no reputation computation and the value remains equal to 1 all experiment
long.
• Conclusion
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4.1.2 Experiment #1 : grey hole with low bitrate
The summary table is on page 32
• The throughput is better with AODV-FUUREX than with AODV-UU.
AODV-FUUREX creates a new route at t=100s when the route are reset.
AODV-UU cannot detect that the data are dropped by the malicious node. The traffic still
flows through the shortest path and is dropped by the grey hole until the end of the experi-
ment.
• The delay of AODV-FUUREX is little bigger than the delay of AODV-UU. This difference
can be due to reputation computation.
The gap in the graphs of AODV-FUUREX is due to packet loss during the period between
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.3: Experiment #1: Reputation node 2
As forwarder on the shortest path, this node is directly used when the experiment is launched.
The reputation is decreasing directly and the activation of the malicious node at t=60s has
no effect on the decrease of the reputation. When the route are reset and the node is no more
used as forwarder, its reputation increases.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.4: Experiment #1: Reputation node 3
This node is on the longest path and is not used at the beginning of the experiment. The
activation of the malicious node at t=60s has no direct effect on its reputation. It is when
the route are reset and that the node becomes the next-hop to join the destination that the
reputation oddly starts to decrease. The reputation of this node remains higher than the
malicious node until the end of the experiment.
• Conclusion In this experiment, there is a real problem in the reputation computation. The
decrease of the reputation when nodes are forwarder cannot be explained by packet loss
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4.1.3 Experiment #2 : grey hole with high bitrate
The summary table is on page 35
• The throughput is not different with a higher bitrate. Like the previous experiment the
traffic restarts after the route reset with AODV-FUUREX.
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.5: Experiment #2: Reputation node 2
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.6: Experiment #2: Reputation node 3

































































































































Traffic Generator - Packetloss
Delay
38
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1.4 Experiment #3 : black hole
The summary table is on page 38
In this experiment it is harder to make comparaison between AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX
because the packets are dropped randomly.
• The throughput is interrupted by some packets drop.
• The packet loss graphs show only the number of data packets which are dropped. The
AODV control packet dropped are not shown on this graph. During the experiment with
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.7: Experiment #3: Reputation node 2
Lies on other reputation graphs, the reputation of the node used at the beginning because
on the shortest path is decreasing directly.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.8: Experiment #3: Reputation node 3
On this graph, the reputation is decreasing from t=72s onwards.
• Node 1 routing table
– For AODV-FUUREX
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1425 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1425 eth0
4 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 2 VAL 2 3241 eth0
This routing table shows that at the beginning of the experiment the path to join the
destination (192.168.0.5) go through 192.168.0.2
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1418 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 INV 2 12030 eth0
4 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 3 VAL 3 3306 eth0
At t=72s, the route to 192.168.0.2 becomes invalid and the next-hop to reach the des-
tination becomes 192.168.0.3 which is on the longest path.
– For AODV-UU
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 2 VAL 1 2374 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 2374 eth0
4 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 2373 eth0
The first path selected by AODV-UU is the shortest one which goes through 192.168.0.2
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1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 3 VAL 3 4318 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 INV 2 14988 eth0
4 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1455 eth0
At t=81s, AODV-UU changes the path to destination like AODV-FUUREX.
• Conclusion
In this experiment, AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX have the same behaviour. Both of them
change the next-hop some time after the malicious node activation.
The malicious node drops AODV messages and the path to the node is invalidated. A RERR
is generated and all the route which have the malicious node has next-hop are dropped and
a new RREQ is directly sent to find a new route.
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4.1.5 Experiment #4 : black hole
The summary table is on page 42
In this experiment it is harder to make comparaison between AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX
because the packets are dropped randomly.
• The throughput is interrupted by packet drop.
• The packet loss graphs shows the data packet dropped. One more time, the comparison
between the two protocols is not possible. The packet are dropped randomly. In this ex-
periment, there is more data packet dropped during the AODV-UU experiment. The path

















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.9: Experiment #4: Reputation node 2
For the node 192.168.0.2, the reputation is like in all the others experiments decreasing at
the beginning.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.10: Experiment #4: Reputation node 3
It is at t=78s that the reputation starts decreasing. It is also at this time that the node is
used as next-hop to join the destination.
• Node 1 routing table
– For AODV-FUUREX
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1576 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1576 eth0
4 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 2 VAL 2 3391 eth0
At the beginning of the experiment, it is the shortest path which is selected to the
destination.
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1618 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1618 eth0
4 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 3 VAL 3 3461 eth0
At t=76s, the routing table change and the node 192.168.0.3 becomes the next-hop to
reach the destination.
– For AODV-UU
1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 2 VAL 2 2224 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1734 eth0
4 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1734 eth0
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1 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqn Expire Flag Iface
2 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 3 VAL 7 3675 eth0
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 INV 2 14790 eth0
4 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1463 eth0
It’s at t=117s that the route change and the next-hop to the destination becomes
192.168.0.3
• Conclusion There is more difference between AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX than the
other experiments with black hole. AODV-UU takes more time to change the route. This
behaviour must be due to the type of packet dropped by the malicious node which drops less
AODV control packet.
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4.2 Orbit Testbed Results
































































































































































































Traffic Generator - Packetloss
Delay
48
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.2.1 Experiment #0 : without malicious node
The summary table is on page 47
• The throughput of this experiment shows clearly some random packet loss as expected in
a real environment.
• The delay of AODV-FUUREX is lower than the delay on the virtual testbed. The highest
peak is at 0.269 ms. This difference can be due to a better time synchronisation between the
nodes and/or a better CPU computation which reduce the AODV-FUUREX computations.
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.11: Experiment #0: Reputation node 2
The gap in the graph shows that the other path is sometime used. The routing information
shows change between the two path for several seconds.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.12: Experiment #0: Reputation node 3
In this graphs, there is still a problem in the reputation computation. The node is not on
the shortest path and is used only some seconds as we can see in the routing informations.
• Node 1 routing table
1 # Time: 06:56:06.858 IP: 192.168.0.1 , seqno: 12
2 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqno Expire Flags Iface
3 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1724 wlan0
4 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1171 wlan0
5 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 2 VAL 12 2997 wlan0
6 # Time: 06:56:09.858 IP: 192.168.0.1 , seqno: 13
7 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqno Expire Flags Iface
8 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 2265 wlan0
9 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 2271 wlan0
10 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 22 VAL 13 5274 wlan0
11 # Time: 06:56:12.859 IP: 192.168.0.1 , seqno: 14
12 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqno Expire Flags Iface
13 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1457 wlan0
14 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1475 wlan0
15 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.3 22 INV 14 13323 wlan0
16 # Time: 06:56:15.859 IP: 192.168.0.1 , seqno: 15
17 Destination Next hop HC St. Seqno Expire Flags Iface
18 192.168.0.2 192.168.0.2 1 VAL 1 1555 wlan0
19 192.168.0.3 192.168.0.3 1 VAL 1 1557 wlan0
20 192.168.0.5 192.168.0.2 11 VAL 14 3418 wlan0
This is an example of the next-hop changes during the experiment. The node 192.168.0.3
becomes the forwarder for several seconds. Most of the time, it is the node 192.168.0.2 which
is on the shortest path which is used as forwarder to reach the destination.
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• Conclusion
The results of this experiment are really different that from the same experiment in the
virtual environment. There is random packet loss which make change the route. The packet
loss have a big influence on the reputation computation. On Orbit, it is the unused node
which has a decreasing reputation at the beginning of the experiment.
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4.2.2 Experiment #1 : grey hole with high bitrate
The summary table is on page 53
• The throughput is in the AODV-FUUREX interrupted at t=60s like on the virtual testbed.
The other route is taken before the route reset due to a invalidation of the route because of
packet loss.
For AODV-UU, the behaviour is like on the virtual testbed. There is some peak which come
from a temporary route change due to packet loss.
• The delay is one more time lower than on the virtual testbed.
















NODE 2 (192.168.0.2) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.13: Experiment #1: Reputation node 2
This graph is the first where the activation of the malicious node is clearly visible. The rep-
utation is decreasing at t=60s and not at the beginning of the experiment. The reputation
increase later on is a problem because the malicious node is activated until the end of the
experiment.
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NODE 3 (192.168.0.3) REPUTATION @ NODE 1 (192.168.0.1)
Reputation
Figure 4.14: Experiment #1: Reputation node 3
In this graph, there is one more time some problem in the reputation computation. There is
no real event which can explain why the reputation is decreasing. Node 192.168.0.3 is used
as forwarder from t=85s to t=150s and from t=207s to t=222s.
• Conclusion
The influence of the environment in the test on Orbit makes the analysis of the experiments
really complex. The packet loss interacts in the route selection and is not always explainable.
4.2.3 Big Topology
The results of the test on the big topology were not good enough to plot graphs.
The sender was unable to reach the destination.
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4.3 Problems detected
This part will present all the problems discovered during the experiments made with AODV-
FUUREX. All the correction made are available on http://git.infonet.fundp.ac.be/cgi-bin/
gitweb.cgi/aodv-fuurex.git
4.3.1 Kernel not supported
To use AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX, a kernel module is needed. The current version of AODV-
UU 1and the provided version 2 of AODV-FUUREX works until the version 2.6.35 of the Linux
kernel. The kernel used on the testbed is newer (version 2.6.39).
The AODV kernel module was not compilable. To fix it some kernel function call were changed.
AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX works now with Linux kernel 2.6.39.
4.3.2 Reputation decreasing until 0
Before using OMF on the virtual testbed, AODV-FUUREX was tested manually on the different
nodes. To generate traffic, the ping (ICMP packets) was used to generate traffic and check the
reputation computation.
During this test, the reputation was indefinitely decreasing until 0.
In the attempts to solve the problem, the traffic was recorded by tcpdump. According to this
traffic capture, packets sent were not broadcast to all the nodes like it must be in wireless envi-
ronment. Watchdog was not able to detect the transmission of the packets by the neighbours and
was decreasing the reputation.
The problem was due to the virtual bridge used to connect the nodes. This bridge was configured
to retain the mac address of the nodes to avoid the broadcast of packets.
To solve this problem the configurations of the bridge has been changed to avoid this behaviour.
• The Spanning Tree Protocol(STP) was deactivated.
• The route remain timer was put to 0.
After that all the packets were broadcasted and the reputation was computed for ICMP packets.
4.3.3 ICMP only
In the first tests on the virtual testbed with OMF the reputation was remaining on 1 for all the
nodes and never changed.
Some test have been made without experiment script to find the problem. To generate some traffic
without traffic generator the linux command ”ping” was used. During the ping test the reputation
was changing.
After some investigation the problem was detected in the implementation of the sniffer used by
watchdog to listen to packets sent by the neighbour. The filter of the sniffer was configured to keep
only ICMP traffic.
To solve the problem, the filter was changed to keep and transmit to watchdog all the data traffic.
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4.3.4 CPU peak
In the first experiments with a malicious node which provoke a route reset and a path change, the















Figure 4.15: Cpu peak
As you can see on Figure 4.15, when the malicious node is activated at t=15:56:45 the CPU
usage increases. This problem was finally due to a infinite loop in the cleaning of the queue of
packet to check in watchdog for the old path. The last element of the list was pointing himself.
After some modification in the implementation the problem was solve and the CPU usage lower.
4.3.5 Reputation computation error
In the reputation graphs shown here above the reputation of the node in use is directly decreasing
without any reason. After investigation and debugging of AODV implementation some problems
have been detected like:
• Watchdog packet sort A sniffer is used to provide the packets from the neighbours to
Watchdog. The sniffer captures all the packets sent in the range of the node.
Some packets must not be used to compute the reputation. There were some mistake in
the filter used to sort the packets. These unfiltered packets were used by Watchdog and
disturbing the reputation computation. The filter has been fixed.
• Global reputation dissemination problem
The global reputation is normally sent to the other node in the option field of RREQ. After
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a deep packet inspection of RREQ message the option field seems to be filled by AODV-
FUUREX but the reputation value sent is always the same.
This problem is not fixed.
• Reputation historic problem
Still in the attempt to fix the reputation computation problem another problem has been
detected. When the global reputation is computed before being sent to the neighbours an
average is made from the 20 last global reputation values.
The global reputation history seems to be corrupted. All the values are equal and change at
each computation of the reputation. The average computation is false.
1 WMA GLOBALE: value 1 = 0.714
2 WMA GLOBALE: value 2 = 0.714
3 WMA GLOBALE: value 3 = 0.714
4 WMA GLOBALE: value 4 = 0.714
5 WMA GLOBALE: value 5 = 0.714
6 WMA GLOBALE: value 6 = 0.714
7 WMA GLOBALE: value 7 = 0.714
8 WMA GLOBALE: value 8 = 0.714
9 WMA GLOBALE: value 9 = 0.714
10 WMA GLOBALE: value 10 = 0.714
11 WMA GLOBALE: value 11 = 0.714
12 WMA GLOBALE: value 12 = 0.714
13 WMA GLOBALE: value 13 = 0.714
14 WMA GLOBALE: value 14 = 0.714
15 WMA GLOBALE: value 15 = 0.714
16 WMA GLOBALE: value 16 = 0.714
17 WMA GLOBALE: value 17 = 0.714
18 WMA GLOBALE: value 18 = 0.714
19 WMA GLOBALE: value 19 = 0.714
20 WMA GLOBALE: value 20 = 0.714
This problem is not fully fixed.
4.3.6 Conclusion
During all the experiments, problems occurs. Some of them are completely fixed, others will need
more work. Here is a summary list.
Problem Resolved Reference
Kernel 2.6.39 support X section 4.3.1
Testbed bridge X section 4.3.2
Reputation for ICMP only X section 4.3.3
CPU peak X section 4.3.4
Watchdog filter X section 4.3.5
Reputation dissemination ✗ section 4.3.5




The main part of this thesis was to create a working experiment script and test the available
implementation of AODV-FUUREX. This chapter will present potential improvements.
5.1 Experimentation improvements
5.1.1 Scenario
The experimentation scenarios are limited. The experiment is divided in two parts, when the
malicious node is activated or not. It could be interesting to be able to activate node by node or
to deactivate the malicious behaviour of one node.
5.1.2 Topology
The test are made on 2 topologies with a limited number of node. Bigger topologies could be
interesting to test the scalability of the network.
Some problems presented in the chapter 11 of [4] should be tested carefully.
5.1.3 Malicious Node
The current implemented malicious node are limited. More complex malicious nodes could be
helpful to highlight the improvements of AODV.
5.1.4 Metrics
Results provided by the logs are limited to the main basics metrics. Some metrics could be added
to improve the test. For example:
• The energy consumption of a node could be monitored. Mobile devices are often used in
Ad-hoc network and works generally on battery. The reduction of energy consumption is one
of the main objectives.
• The metrics provided by the traffic generator are only based on the data traffic. The AODV
message statistics are not recorded. It could be interesting to know the impact of malicious
nodes on the AODV traffic and to compute the overhead of AODV messages.
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5.2 Implementation improvements
In the previous chapter, some implementation problems are explained and must be fixed. This
section presents modifications which could improve AODV-FUUREX.
5.2.1 Linux kernel 3.0 supporting
The current version of the kernel module used by AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX is not compi-
lable with Kernel Linux 3.x. It could be interesting to use AODV with this kernel version which
increasingly widespread.
5.2.2 Threshold to route reset
In all the experiment with malicious node, there is a delay between the detection of the malicious
node and the route change. This delay could be reduced if the route reset was activated earlier.
A good move could be to provoke the route resetting when the reputation is under a fixed or
computed value.
Another way to solve the problem without reset all the nodes could be to invalidate the route in
the routing table to restart the process of RREQ without restarting all other routes.
5.3 Security weakness
This section presents some scenario which could be problematic. None of them have been tested.
5.3.1 Shielded malicious node
In this scenario, there are 2 malicious nodes working together. These nodes must be in border of
the network.
Figure 5.1: 2 nodes attacks
The first node is in the network (like M1 on the figure 5.1) and the second is only connected to
M1 (like M2) With this configuration, M2 is completely isolated and the only neighbour in range
is M1.
Two nodes are needed in this scenario to avoid problems with watchdog and a decreasing of the
reputation. Node M1 must forward all the packet received to keep a good reputation. This
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reputation will be also used to M2 which can inject forged packet with the reputation of M1.
The forged packet can be used to make a black-hole and attract all the traffic, to disconnect node
sending RERR or disturb the network. The node M1 is like a reputation shield.
5.3.2 Spoofing IP
In the current implementation of AODV-FUUREX, the reputation is only linked by the IP address
as explained in section 2.9.3. If a node has a bad reputation, it can only change its IP address to
have a better reputation.
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The goals of this thesis are to check the validity and test the performance of AODV-FUUREX
which adds a secure layer on AODV-UU (an implementation of the RFC 3561).
With this secure layer all the nodes compute the reputation of their neighbours. The computed
reputation is used in the route selection. If the reputation is bad, the node will changed the route
if another exist.
To test this reputation, two types of malicious nodes were executed during the experiments. To
check the validity and the utility of the reputation computation, tests were made on AODV-UU
and AODV-FUUREX.
With the gray hole which is one of the implemented malicious behaviour. The results are clear.
AODV-FUUREX detects the malicious node and changes the route to the destination. With
AODV-UU, the route stays and all the packets are dropped after the activation of the malicious
node.
The results with the black hole are more mitigated. AODV-UU and AODV-FUUREX discover the
malicious node and change the route. When the drop rate of this malicious node is too important
there are not enough ”Hello message” transmitted and the route is invalidated. This leak of Hello
message is interpreted as a disconnected node.
These tests have been made on two different environment which have also big impact on the
results obtained.
On the virtual testbed, routes change only when there is a malicious node or when a node is dis-
connected. The throughput graphs are constant and there is no packet loss.
In this situation it is easy to see when the malicious node is activated and the computation of the
reputation is normally easier.
Tests on the real testbed give other results. The graphs are more variable and there are more
packet loss due to the radio interferences. It’s harder to analyse.
During these tests problems occur. Problems are not easy to fix in network environment. The
hardest thing is to identify the source of the problem. It can be in the experiment script, in the
routing algorithm or in the test environment.
It becomes an advantage to have two different environments and two implementations of the rout-
ing algorithms. Change of environment or implementation can help to find the problem.
A lot of time has been taken to fix problems met during the experiments. The bugs in the environ-
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ment configuration and in the experiment script are fixed but some remain in the implementation
of AODV-FUUREX and will need more work to be completely fixed.
The main problem is in the reputation computation. In the results, the reputation of the node in
use is decreasing without any reasons. A source of the problem has been detected but not com-
pletely fixed.
After all these tests and debugging, the current implementation of AODV-FUUREX sounds
promising, the detection of grey hole works.
In the last chapter, some improvements are presented to reduce the reaction time when a malicious
node is detected.
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